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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
THE INFANT AND NEGLIGENCE PER SE IN PENNSYLVANIA
by
J. DOUGLAS MERTZ*
The statute and the infant met in D'Ambrosio et al. v. City of Philadelphia.'
The infant, aged twelve years and eight months, with several companions boarded
the rear of a truck without the driver's knowledge of their presence and rode on the
tailgate. When the truck struck a hole in the street of the defendant city, the jolt
threw off the plaintiff resulting in his injury. In the suit against, the city, the
Supreme Court held that the minor plaintiff was negligent per se because he vio-
lated the Vehicle Code, as amended by Act of June 27, 1939, P.L. 1135, section
1023, P. L. 1179, 75 P. S. sec. 632.2 "In the absence of the statute," said the
Court, "the minor plaintiff's contributory negligence would have been for the
jury. But the legislature established a standard of conduct for all persons which
neither court nor jury could set aside in a case within its terms ... As the plain-
tiff's conduct was a direct violation of the statute, thl question for decision is
whether a jury in a civil suit may be permitted to set aside the statute."3
The trial court was of the opinion that the legislature did not intend to make
riding on a tailboard negligence per se in all cases. "If it did, then it has obliter-
erated in this type of case the familiar rule that a child under seven is conclusively
presumed to be careful and a child between seven and fourteen is rebuttably
presumed to be careful, and that the negligence of the second group is always
for the jury."' The Court answered, "The error is in ignoring the comprehensive
mandate of clause (b), 'No person shall ... ' " Citing In Re Elkins Estate, the
opinion points out that, "A saving from the operation of statutes for disabilities
must be expressed, or it does not exist."6
*A. B., Ursinus College, 1938; LL. B., Yale Law School, 1942; Professor of Law, Dickinson
School of Law; member of Lehigh County Bar.
147 A. 2d. 256. (1946).
2"(b) No person shall hang onto, or ride on, the outside or rear end of any vehicle, and
no person on a bicycle, roller skates, sled, or similar device, shall hold fast to or hitch to any
moving vehicle, and no operator of a vehicle shall knowingly permit any person to hang onto,
or ride on, the outside or rear end of the-vehicle which he is operating, or allow any person on a
bicycle, roller skates, sled or any similar device to hold fast or hitch onto the vehicle which he is
operating on any public highway, and no owner of a vehicle, if present, shall knowingly permit
any person to operate any vehicle under his control in' violation of this subsection.
"(c) ... Any person violating any of the provisions of subsection (b) of this section shall,
upon summary conviction before a magistrate, be sentenced to pay a fine of (5) dollars and costs
o prosecution, and in default of the payment thereof, shall undergo imprisonment for not more
than three (3) days."





The issue one takes with the case is the extension of the negligence per se
doctrine to a situation in which the person violating the statute is an infant. To
evaluate the decision, it is necessary to examine the rule being "obliterated" and
the doctrine employed to destroy the rule.
It is generally admitted that the standard of conduct for children used in
determining negligence is not that of adults.7 A different standard is used
because a child may not have the capacity to perceive a risk and realize its danger.
He may not be able to exercise the qualities of attention, intelligence and judgment
necessary to such a perception and realization. 8 If there is to be this other standard
for children, two problems are posed. By what standard is the child's conduct
to be measured and when has the child attained those qualities necessary to per-
ceive danger equivalent to those of an adult?
The standard of conduct is that to be expected of a child of like age, capacity
and experience. 9  Of course, the application of this standard is only possible
after the determination of the second consideration, to wit, that the child is of
such inferior capacity to bring the special standard into operation. The chief
difficulty is to determine within what ages the special standard applies. The
child of like age, intelligence and experience only serves to supply the careful and
prudent child by which the infant actor's conduct is judged. Age is important
in this judgment because it gives some indication as to what to expect in physical
ability, knowledge and judgment. If a child has the capacity to appreciate the risk
and to avoid it, but is more reckless and daring than ordinary children of his
age, he will be judged by the conduct of such ordinary children. 10
The determination of an age classification to which the special standard
shall apply is strikingly similar to the problem confronting the courts in cases of the
infant charged with commission of a crime. In criminal law the capacity of the
child to distinguish between right and wrong is involved. When has the child
attained the mental development necessary to criminal intent? There is a need
for arbitrary rules to preclude speculation as to the precise age at which this men-
tal development is attained.11 Just so, "The law fixes no arbitrary period when the
immunity of children ceases and the responsibilities of life begin ... At what age
7
Prosser, Win. L., Handbook of the Law of Torts, (1941), pp. 229-231.
8Restatement, Torts, (1934), secs. 283 (e), 289 (h) ; Nagle v. Allegheny Valley Railroad Co.,
88 Pa. 35 (1878), " . . . not sufficient capacity or discretion to understand danger, and to use the
proper means to avoid it .... the incapacity'of the child to know the danger and avoid it, shields
it from responsibility." p. 38.; Parker v. Washington Electric St. Ry., 56 A. 1001, 207 'Pa. 438,
"Measure of responsibility of a child for contributory negligence is his capacity to understand and
avoid danger." p. 1002; DiMeglio v. Philadelphia & R. Ry. Co., 97 A. 476, 252 -Pa. 391 (1916);
Strawbridge v. Bradford, 18 A. 346, 128 Pa. 200 (1889); Kirschner'v. Oil City St. Ry. Co., 59 A.
270, 210 Pa. 45 (1904) ; Cress v. Philadelphia & R. Ry. Co., 77 A. 810,.228 Pa. 482; Neidlinger v.
Haines, 200 A. 581; (1938), Kehler v. Schwenk, 144 Pa. 348,'22 A. 910 (1891).
9Restatement, Torts, (1934), secs. 464, 263(e); West Philadelphia Passenger Ry. Co. v.
Gallagher, 108 Pa. 524 (1885); McMillen v. Steele, 119 A. 721, 275 Pa. 584 (1923); 'Liguori v.
City of Phila., 41 A. 2d. 563, 351 Pa. 494 (1945).'
1OPhiladelphia City Passenger Ry. Co. v. Hassard, 75 Pa. 366 (1874).
liHitchler, W. H., The Law of Crimes, (1939), Vol. 1, p. 126.
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
then must an infant's responsibility be presumed to commence? This question
cannot be answered by referring it to the jury. That would furnish us with no
rule whatever. It would give us a mere shifting standard affected by the sym-
pathies and prejudices of the jury in each particular case . . . It is a question of
law for the court.' 12  Following the analogy to the responsibility for crime,
Pennsylvania established the rule that a child under seven years of age is con-
clusively presumed to be incapable of appreciating danger and guarding against
it, a child between seven and fourteen years old is presumed to be incapable of
appreciating danger, but this prsumption is rebuttable and grows 'ess strong each
year until the child attains the age of fourteen, when it is presumed the child is
capable of appreciating danger and subject to the ordinary rules of negligence.1 3
In the Nagle case, 1" the court claimed the solution not to be difficult in arriving at a
presumption of capacity to understand danger at the age of fourteen. Since the law
had established that a fourteen year old infant could select a guardian, contract a
marriage, and harbor malice and kill under circumstances that constituted murder,
"... it therefore requires no strain to hold that at fourteen an infant is presumed
to have sufficient capacity and understanding to be sensible of danger and to
have the power to avoid it."' 15 The age presumptions ignore mental and psycho-
logical age. They are, " ... only convenient points in the uncertain line between
capacity and incapacity, at which the law changes the presumption."'15a
The age presumptions are criticized as arbitrary rules founded on a faulty
analogy with the criminal law doctrine of capacity.16 There is no valid compari-
son between the capacities being established by the use of the presumptions. A
perception and judgment between right and wrong are separate and apart from,
and perhaps even psychologically and physiologically different than a perception
and judgment of a danger involved in an act. A recently edited criminal text
even suggests that mental capacity has no place in tort liability, " . . . for the
object of the action is to compensate the party injured, and not to punish the
child."' 17 Fictitious and arbitrary as they may be, the presumptions are justified
on the grounds of expediency and facility of administration.' Except for the
declaration that all infants below seven years of age are incapable of negligence,
tht age presumptions ostensibly only determine whether the child is capable of
negligence but do not fix the standard of care.
Because the child has attained the age of fourteen and is therefore presumed
to be capable of recognizing and avoiding danger, does not deprive him of being
12Nagle v. Allegheny Valley Ry. Co.. 88 Pa. 35, 39. (1878).
13Parker v. Washington Electric Ry. Co., supra, n. 8; supra, n. 12; Kehler v. Schwenk,'supra, n.
8. For the presumptions in criminal law, see Hitchler, supra n. 11, p. 125 et seq.
14Supra, n. 12.
161bid. at pp. 39-40.
16albid., at p. 40.
1 6
Prosser, supra n. 7, p. 231.
l7Clark & Marshall, A Treatise on the Law of Crimes, (4th ed. 1940), sec. 76, p. 115.
18Shulman, The Standard of Care Required of Children, 37 Yale L. J. 618.
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judged by the standard of a child of like age, intelligence and experience. In
Kehier v. Schwenk, the court points out:
" . . . the increase of responsibility is gradual. It makes no sudden
leap at the age of fourteen. That is simply the convenient point at
which the law . . ., changes the presumption of capacity, and puts upon
the infant the burden of showing his personal want of intelligence,
prudence, foresight or strength usual in those of such age. The standard
remains the same, to wit, the average capacity of others in his condi-
tion."19
A fifteen year old boy is not required to remember the presence of a submerged
pipe in a swimming pool of which he had knowledge a year ago. He is held,
".. . only to such measure of discretion as is usual in those of his age and exper-
ience. ' 20 The decisions do not foreclose the infant of fourteen years or over
from showing that he did not have the mental capacity or qualities of per-
ception normal for one of his age.21 In most cases, the infant cannot sustain
this as a matter of proof. As a consequence, the courts treat him as an adult.
The courts have not hesitated to declare an infant of fourteen years of age
and upward to be contributorily negligent as a matter of law if the act was such that
had the actor been an adult he would have been contributorily'negligent. Turning
a bicycle across the path of an approaching auto,22 feeding a threshing machine
from an obviously dangerous position,23 crossing a track in front of a locomo-
tive,24 riding on the platform of an electric car when there was room inside,25 using
a hazardous way when a safe way was availablL, 21-have been held contributory
negligence as a matter of law.
The standard of care required of children has been for the most part deduced
from cases in which the child's contributory negligence was in issue. It is said
no difference in principle is to be observed. 2" In the case of adults, it is generally
assumed that the standard of conduct of negligence and contiibutory negligence
is the same. 23 There is doubt expressed by the writers of the Restatement of
Torts that statements as to the standard of care required of children by analogy to
contributory negligence situations are beyond criticism:
"It may be that children should not be required to conform to a particular
standard in order to relieve an admittedly negligent defendant from
19144 Pa. 348, 22 A. 910 (1891).
20Liguori v. City of Philadelphia, supra n. 9.
21Flowers v. Pistella, 200 A. 904 (Pa. Super.) (1938) ; Rice v. King, 165 A. 833 (1933) ; Miller
v. City of Erie et al., 16 A. 2d. 37 (1940). For the results-of this rule see note 44.22
Geiger v. Garrett, 113 A. 195, 270 Pa. 192 (1921).
23Rice v. King, supra n. 21.24
Nagle v. Allegheny Ry. Co., supra n. 12.25
Kirschner v. Oil City Ry. Co., supra n. 8.
26Simpkins v. Penna. R. Co., 5 A. 2d. 103 (1939), Seventeen year old minor treated as an
adult without discussion.2 7
Prosser, supra n. 7, p. 230; Shulman, supra n. 18.
2
SBohlen, F. H., Studies in the Law of Torts, (1926), p. 527; Restatement, Torts, (1934), sec.
289(a).
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liability to them. It does not necessarily follow that a child should not
be requred to conform to a higher standard of behavior where it is neces-
sary for the protection of innocent members of the public."
29
Thus the child would be measured by a less rigorous standard of behavior
when he is the injured plaintiff than he would be if he were the negligent actor
defendant.
In the use of the age presumption applicable to children between seven
and fourteen years of age, Pennsylvania has developed a tradition of submitting
the issue of the child's negligence to the jury. This has been expressed in recent
decisions as " . . . a well established principle that the contributory negligence
of a child of ten years old is for the jury," 0 and, "The question of contributory
negligence of a child of twelve years of age is particularly one for the jury under the
decisions of this court." 81 It is not the age of the child which supports this prac-
tice. The responsibility of the child is predicated upon his knowledge and exper-
ience and on the character of th danger to which he is exposed. The existence of
those factors are based upon interpretation of facts, a function of the jury.3 2 The
facts are frequently in dispute and the interpretations and inferences of thm
doubtful. In the Nagel case ss and the Parker case,84 the Court was careful in its
language to reserve unto itself the right to declare the presumption rebutted as a
matter of law if the facts were beyond doubt. Even children will be contributorily
negligent if they do not avoid a danger obvious to one of their age, intelligence and
experience. An eleven year old girl is negligent as a matter of law if she climbs
over a wire fence to reach a drinking fountain in a playground and falls, when
there is a safe access to the fountain by a slightly longer route known to the
child.35 A twelve year old minor was non-suited because he took an obvious
risk in attempting to cross between, railroad cars by climbing over the coupling
while the train halted on the crossing. 6 While the court has retained its right,
it has seldom used it, and the principle that the negligence of. children between
the ages of seven and fourteen is for the jury has gained a traditional and familiar
place in our law.
That the rule has entrenched itself firmly is borne out by an examination
of the issue in Gress v. Philadelphia & R. Ry. Co.87 A girl within ten days of her
fourteenth birthday led her six year old brother across the defendant's railroad
29
Tentative Draft of the Restatement of Torts, sec. 167 (Tent. Draft, Part IV.)
S0Harris et al. v. Seiavitch, 336 Pa. 294, 9 A. 2d. 375 (1939).
31Fabel v. Hazlett, 157 Pa. Super. 416, 43 A. 2d. 373.
SlParker v. Washingtoti Electric St. Ry. Co., supra n. 84 Kelley v. Pittsburgh & Birmingham
Traction Co., 204 Pa. 623, 54 A. 482 (1903); Byron et al; v. Central Ry. of N. J., 64 A. 328,
215 Pa. 82 (1906) ; DiMeglio v. Philadelphia & R. Ry. Co., supra n. 8; Danze'v. Devlin, 195 A,
882 (1938) ; Strawbridge v. Bradford, supra n. 8.
$SSupra n. 12.
S4Supra n. 8. Also see dicta in Braden v. City of Pittsburgh, 18 A. 2d. 99 (1941).
S1Brown v. City of Scranton, 313 Pa. 230, 169 A. 435 (1933).8 6Studer v. Southern Pacific Co., 53 Pac. 942, Calif. (1898).
STSuprA a. 8.
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tracks in a manner in which it would have been negligent for an adult to proceed.
The Court decided the minor plaintiff was negligent as a matter of law and a non-
suit was proper. The majority reasoned that since " . . . the legal presumption of
her incapacity to appreciate and avoid injury had reached that point in the dim-
inishing scale when it was almost a negligible quantity," and within ten days the
presumption would have been the other way, it had the power to declare the
plaintiff negligent as a matter of law. Three able colleagues, Justices Elkin,
Mestrezat, and Moschzisker, dissented on the ground that the question of con-
tributory negligence of the minor was for the jury. In Strawbridge v. Bradford,8s
the Court refused to find that an infant of thirteen years eight months was con-
tributorily negligent as a matter of law because he was familiar with an elevator
with open sides as an employee who made frequent use of it. Similarly, a boy
under fourteen years riding on the lower step of the front platform of a street
car over a long distance and only holding on with one hand had the issue of his
conduct submitted to a jury.3 9 But a fifteen year old boy standing on the plat-
form of a moving electric car when there was room inside was held to be negli-
gent by the court.' 0 The Pennsylvania decisions have not been as stringent as the
California court in Studer v. Southern Pacific Co., supra note 36, in applying the
obvious danger doctrine to the seven to fourteen year old age group. In Kelley v.
Pittsburgh & Birmingham Traction Co.41 a twelve year old stepped in front of an
unlighted train; and in Byron v. Central Ry. of N. 1.42 a youth under fourteen
stepped in front of an engine apparently without looking or listening. In both
cases the jury determined the issue of contributory negligence. The cpurt in the
Byron case saw " . .. no reason to distinguish the case at bar from the long line
of cases in which this rule (of submitting the issue of the infant's contributory
negligence to the jury) has been recognized and followed in our state."' 43
To summarize, Pennsylvania does not apply the standard of care of adults
in negligence cases to children. In consideration of the child's incapacity to per-
ceive danger and avoid it, it measures his conduct by that of children of the same
age, intelligence and experience. At what ages this special standard is applied
is determined by the use of presumptions analogous to those employed in the
field of criminal law to ascertain whether an infant has the capacity to commit
crime. While the use of age presumptions are justifiable only by facility of admin-
istration and expediency, they have, nevertheless, assumed a fixed and familiar
role in this jurisdiction. By their use the infant below seven has been eliminated
dis a problem by the arbitrary declaration that he is incapable of contributory
3SSupra n. 8.
39West Philadelphia Passenger Ry. Co. v. Gallagher, supra n. 9.4 0
Kirschner v. Oil City St. Ry. Co., supra n. 8.
41Supra n. 32.4 2
Supra n. 32.
43Parenthetical material my own. Cf. Nagle v. Allegheny Valley Ry. Co., supra n. 12, in
which a fourteen year old minor was held contributorily negligent as a matter of law because he
failed to stop, look and listen.
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negligence. The child of fourteen years and above has in fact been judged by an
adult standard. 44 Children from seven to fourteen years have been given special
consideration in the measurement of their conduct. Generally, their conduct has
been determined by a jury. This has been because the ascertainment of the
capacity to perceive danger involves the determination of judgment factors, i. e.,
knowledge, intelligence, experience, character of the danger, which are often
associated with questions of fact and hardly ever beyoned reasonable doubt. In
addition, a long line of cases has made this treatment of the standard of care issue
for children in this age group traditional and familiar. The rule being abrogated
in the D'Ambrosio case is a familiar one, indeed.
The violation of a statute intended to protect individuals or a class of indi-
viduals, of which the injured person is one, from a hazard or harm which has in fact
occurred to produce the injury is negligence per se, i. e., in itself, and the court
so directs the jury."5 Why a statute which creates no civil liability is construed
to create civil liability has taxed the ingenuity of judges and writers. Some courts
have been content with th'e assertion that the statute creates a criminal liability
and therefore creates a civil liability, without explaining the "therefore," which
i:, the crux of the problem." 6 The intent of the legislature to create a civil liabil-
ity has been read into the statutes by some courts, when the lawmakers did not have
civil 'liability in mind at all, and may even have deliberately omitted to provide
for it.47 A more plausible theory is that the reasonably prudent man does not
disobey the law, hence, if he violates a statute he is no longer a reasonably pru-
dent man, and therefore, is negligent; and the court shall tell the jury in certain
terms.48 These theories do not explain the refusal of the court to leave the issue
44This occurs in every case in which the court holds that an infant of fourteen years or older
is contributorily negligent as a matter of law. If an adult would have perceived the act or omission
under consideration of the court to be an exposure of an unreasonable risk of harm to himself,
the infant is held to the same standard of perception because he is presumed to have the capacity
of an adult in that respect. The presumption operates until it is overcome "by clear proof of the
absence of such discretion and intelligence as is usual with infants of fourteen years of, age." Rice
v. King (1933) supra n. 21. The proof is not what a child of similar age and discretion might
have done under the circumstances, it is "proof of the absence of such discretion." Flowers v.
Pistella, supra n. 21. Unless the infant can show that he is sub-standard he cannot remove the
consideration of his act from the court to the jury. Since such proof is rarely available a a matter
of fact, the expressions, that if the jury were to consider his conduct, it would be judged by the
recognized standard in infant cases are meaningless. In connection herewith, note the expression
of the court in Rice v. King, supra, that at sixteen and one-half years of age the presumption of
capacity is greater.
4'Harper, F. W., A Treatise on the Law of Torts, (1933), pp. 193-195; Prosser, supra n. 7, pp.
274-278; Restatement, Torts, (1934), sec. 286. That the more accurate term is duly per se, 36
Dickinson L.R. 192, 193.
4 6
Parker v. Barnard, 135 Mass. 116 (18A3).
4
7
Lowndes, Civil Liability Created by Criminal Legislation, 16 Minn. L.R. 361, 364, "A right
is simply the ex post facto aspect of a remedy, and it savors of absurdity to impute to the legis-
lature an intention to create a civil liability, where it has manifested no intention of creating a civil
remedy."
4SThayer, Public Wrong and Private Action, 27 Harvard LR 317, 322; Martin v. Hertzog,
228 N.Y. 164, 126 N.E. 814 (1920), Cardozo, J., "By the very terms of the hypothesis, to omit,
willfully or heedlessly, the safeguards prescribed by law for the benefit of another that he may
be preserved in life and limb, is to fall short of the standard of diligence to which those who live
in organized society are under a duty to conform."
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to the jury.49 Professor Prosser submits that the best explaination is "that the courts
are seeking by a species of judicial legislation, to further the ultimate policy for the
protection of individuals which they find underlying the statute, and which they
believe the legislature must have had in mind," 50
Pennsylvania courts recognize that a statute may establish a conclusive stan-
dard of conduct. If such a statute is violated that act constitutes negligence per
se and the jury may not consider the question. Considerable difficulty has arisen
as to when the standards established by the statutes are conclusive.bI  Statutes
clearly intended to protect a particular class of persons from their own inability
to protect themselves are held to establish a conclusive standard which will abrogate
the usual defenses of contributory negligence. 52  The Child Labor Acts have been
so construed. The failure to keep duplicate lists as required by the Acts was suf-
ficient to find the employer liable as a matter of law for injuries to an unlawfully
-mployed minor while at work.58 No negligence need be averred other than the
employment of the minor." + If the injury has occurred in the course of unlawful
employment, " ... that is enough to show a causal connection and the law will
refer the injury to the original wrong as its proximate cause."56  The statute for-
bidding the sale of firearms to a minor under sixteen years of age subjects the
vendor, who, violates it, to liability for accidents regardless of the minor's capacity.
The liability extendes to any natural or probable results of the act of sale.
56
Statutes which purport to provide safe places in which to work and statutes for-
bidding the sale of liquor to intoxicated persons have been held to be conclusive.67
Any statement of the reasons for applying negligence per se rules in these cases
must be weighted heavily with the strong policy considerations involved in these
situations and is not valid for other statutes dealing with other types of conduct.
For example, contrast the language in Littell v. Young,68 a case which involved
4 9Cardozo, J., in Martin v. Hertzog, ibid, declares that the standard of conduct having
been fixed by the legislature "jurors have no dispensing power by which to relax it." Thayer,
supra n. 48, argues that a jury should not be allowed to say that a reasonable man will disobey the
law.
50Prosser, supra n. 7, p. 265.
5IRestatement, Torts, (1934), Penna. Annotations (1938), sec. 285.
52 Stehle v. Jaeger Automatic Machine Co., 220 Pa. 617 (1908), andicases cited in notes 53 to 56
inclusive below.
5SChabot v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass, 259 Pa. 504 (1918); Mitchell v. Mione Mfg. Co., 112 Pa.
Super. 394 (1934) violation of a similar provision of the act relating to employment certificates.
54Zelinko v. Pittsburgh Coal Co., 68 Pa. Super. :39 (1917) ; Faiola v. Calderone, 275 Pa. 303
(1923).
55Krutlies v. Bulls Head Coal Co., 249 Pa. 162, 166 (1915). Cf., if the original employment
is not prohibited, and the minor is injured while at lawful work, that he was sometimes employed
at an unlawful occupation which was hazardous is not negligence per se. Johnson v. Endura Mfg.
Co., 282 Pa. 322 (1925).
56McMillen v. Steele, 275 Pa. 584 (1923); Shaffer v. Mowery, 265 Pa. 300 (1919) ; Mantino
v. Piercedale Supply Co., 13 A. 2d. 51.
5
7
See cases cited in Penna. Annotations (1938) to Restatement, Torts, (1934), sec. 285 (b).
Contributory negligence is an available defense in the safety regulation statutes cases but assump-
tion of risk is not. Dobra v. Lehigh Valley Coal Co., 250 Pa. 313.
58 5 Pa. Super. 205 (1897).
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the sale of liquor to an intoxicated person, wifh the attitude of the courts toward
Motor Vehicle Code violations developed below:
"An act done in violation of a criminal statute is of itself an act of neg-
ligence, and makes the party doing it responsible for the proximate
consequences of his act."
The standards established by traffic regulations were not definitely declared
to be fixed and conclusive standards until the decision of links v. Currie.50 Prior
to this case, a plaintiff who drove past a standing street car at high speed while
the car was discharging passengers had his act characterized as a "flagrant viola-
tion"60 of statute, and an " ... important fact to be considered. . . " by the jury.
A left turn made by a truckdriver against tht current of traffic without keeping
in line " . . . in direct violation . . . " of the Motor Vehicle Code " . . . was at
least evidence of it (negligence) on a two way street."6 2  This line of decisions
reached its zenith in the gratuitous words in the decision of Johnson v. American
Reduction Co. :3
"It is not negligence per se to ignore a statutory duty in driving a vehicle,
and it was not the proximate cause of this accident."
On its facts, the decision of the Johnson case is sound on the second ground. The
violation did not produce the harm nor affect the manner of its occurrence at all.
The trend began to change with Jamison v. Kamerer"4 where making a left turn
without looking or signalling " . . . was negligence, statutorily determined to be
so .... This was followed by Dempsey v. Cuneo Eastern Press Ink Co, of
Penna.6 5 In that case, it was alleged that the defendant swerved his truck from
the right lane without cause and struck the plaintiff. The court said, "Admittedly
this, if true, . . . convicts defendant's driver of negligence, and makes the defen-
dant liable to the plaintiff, unless decedent was contributorily negligent . . . " In
Stark v. Fullerton Trucking Co., 68 the plaintiff's decedent crashed into a stalled
truck and a car which had collided with the stalled vehicle. The decedent failed
to operate his car at such a speed which enabled him to stop within the assured
clear distance ahead as required by statute. The pronouncement of the court was
clear:
59188 A. 356, 324 Pa. 532 (1936).
O0Bohm v. Beckdol & Welker, 81 Pa. Super. 178 (1923).
6ILewis v. Wood, 247 Pa. 545.
2
Wilson v. Consolidated Dress Beef Co., 295 Pa. 168 (1929).
61158 A. 153, 305 Pa. 537 (1931), at p. 154. Contrast with the loose language of the
court in Weimer v. Westmoreland Water Co., 127 Pa. Super. 201, 193 A. 665, 668, where in
discussing the probative effect of a regulation of the Department of Labor & Industry it said, "Al-
though a statute or ordinance may be offered as evidence of negligence, it cannot be considered
a sole basis of recovery." The decision of the court on the evidential use of the administrative
regulation is commendable.
64313 Pa. 15. (1933).
6
5318'Pa. 557, 560. (1935).
66318 Pa. 541 (1935).
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. . . the requirement is fixed and unchangeable ... The statute was
passed to protect life and limb; . . . and the statute must be construed to
further that purpose."
6 7
With these cases already pointing the way, links v. Currie came before the court
for decision. The driver of a car attempted to pass a truck at an intersection when
the truck veered toward the left to negotiate a left turn striking the car and forcing
it into an abutment. The trial court charged that the violation of the Motor
Vehicle Code, 75 P. S. 543, which prohibits passing at intersections was negligence
per se. The Supreme Court approved the charge, as follows:
"The section of the Act is a positive mandate, a 'thou shalt not.' . . the
violation of such a mandatory provision of the law, passed for the pur-
pose of aiding safe operation of motor vehicles on the public highways,
is negligence per se . . . -69
Not every violation of a statute is negligence per se. The act must be within
the prohibited hazards and be a substantial factor in causing the injury.70  The
D'Ambrosio case recognizes this principle with a clarity of expression not always
employed in earlier decisions. 71 To support the statement that not every violation
is negligence per se, the Court relies on four cases 72 which hold that the act which
constitutes the statutory violation must be an efficient cause of the injury in order
to rule that the negligence per se principle applies. The expression "proximate
cause" is frequent in the cases.7 3 The overlapping of the hazard problem and
the causal question, which is typical of the negligence field in general, has carried
over into this problem. 74 Unless the statute is dealing with the hazard which has
occurred to produce the injury, the violation cannot have any causal connection
with the harm. It is easy to slide into language which is not distinct enough to
clarify the difference between whether the hazard is not within the purview of
the statute or whether, even though the hazard is within its purview, nevertheless,
k7lbid., p. 544. The court went on "o hold that the decedent's presumption of due care
has no existence as against the certainty that if he had done so here (taken all precaution) he
would not have died."
68Supra n. 59.
stIbid., citing Restatement, Torts, (1934), sec. 286.
70Restatement, Torts, (1934), secs. 286; 469; 36 Dickinson L.R. 192, 193, 200; Harper, supra
n. 45, p. 193; D'Ambrosio v. City of Philadelphia, supra n. 1.
71Supra n. 1 at p. 259, " . . . there was no dispute of fact from which the jury could find
that his act was not within the prohibited hazards and was not a substantial factor in causing
his injury; his violation of the statute was negligence per se."
72jinks v. Currie, supra n. 59; Lane v. Mullen, 131 A. 718, 285 Pa. 161 (1926), "Where
the failure to heed the statute did not bring about the result complained of, the statute drops out
of the factors to be considered." at p. 719.; Purol, Inc. v. Great Eastern System, Inc., 130 Pa.
Super, 341, 197 A. 543 (1938), in which the court after a review of the cases holds that efficient
cause as used in the opinions means "substantial factor in bringing about the harm;" in accord
with Restatement, Torts, (1934) sec. 431. Vunak v. Walters, 157 Pa. Super. 660, 43 A. 2d. 536
(1945). In accord: Gaskill v. Melelia, 144 Pa. 'Super. 78, 18 A. 2d. 455 (1941); Ennis v.
Atkin, 47 A. 2d. 217 (1946); Johnson v. American Reduction Co., supra n. 63; Ross v. Reigelman,
14 A. 2d. 591 (Pa. Supreme Ct.) (1941); Hayes v. Shoemaker, 302 Pa. 72 (1930).7
3Gaskill v. Melelia, Ennis v. Atkin, Ross v. Reigelman, and cases reviewed and cited in Purol,
Inc. v. Great Eastern System, Inc., supra n. 72.
74
For the confusion of the cause problem with the hazard issue generally, see Eldridge, Laur-
ence H., Modern Tort Problems, (1941), pp. 17-24.
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the violation was not a substantial factor in producing the particular harm which
occurred in the case. InSalvatti v. Thrappe25 it was held that passing on a curve
where the view is obstructed, which is a violation of the Motor Vehicle Code, was
not contributory negligence because the purpose of the statute was to prevent
headon collisions. In the case, the truck, which the plaintiff was in the act of
passing, swerved to the left forcing the plaintiff to leave the road and crash. The
accident was not the result of the hazard contemplated in the statute and the viola-
tion had no causal relation to the accident even if it was a negligent act, said the
Court. In Zandras v. Moffett, 76 the Court found nothing in the statute, which pro-
hibits a vehicle from passing another proceeding in the same direction on the right,
to indicate an intention that the legislature required, that in all cases, regardless
of circumstances, the width of the road, the position of the leading car or volume
of traffic, a vehicle must pass to the left. Hence, such passing was deemed not to
be a proximate cause of the harm.
If the evidence that the act, which constitutes the violation of a statute, is a
substantial factor, is not clear, unmistakable and free from reasonable doubt, the
question of cause is for the jury.77 Negligence per se founded upon a statutory
violation of a traffic regulation does not preclude the defense of contributory
negligence. 78 The actor-violator may also show that he is within an exception of
the statute or that he is excused by an act of necessity.
79
Whether the civil standard of reasonable conduct always requires obedience
to the criminal statutes is for the courts to determine.8 0 We have examined the
theories devised to substantiate and rationalize the creation of civil liability from
criminal liability. The decisions concerning the Motor Vehicle Code, the statute
with which the D'Ambrosio case deals, show a growth from its use as evidence of
negligence to the declaration that a violation of it is negligence per se. The
standards of the Code have become fixed and conclusive because the court is con-
vinced that highway safety and the protection of life and limb" 'which it assures
to the public and users of the highway is a commendable social purpose, and the
court is willing to indulge in judicial legislation to promote it. Whether this is
sufficient justification to apply the negligence per se rule in the D'Ambrosio case
does not depend so much upon the theories upon which the doctrine has gained
75 23 A. 2d. 445, 138 A.L.R. 892, 343 Pa. 642.
76286 Pa. 477 (1926). This case must be considered in the light of the interpretation the
Motor Vehicle Code was receiving at the time of the decision.
77Vunak v. Walters, supra n. 72; Warlich v. Miller, 141 F. 2d. 168 (1944); Landis v. Cone-
stoga Transp. Co., 36 A. 2d. 466 (1944); Bricker v. Gardner, 48 A. 2d. 209 (1946), Marchl v.
Dowling & Co., 41 A. 2d. 427 (1945).
78Dempsey v. Cuneo Eastern Press Ink Co. of Pa., supra n. 65; Gaskill v. Melelia, supra n. 72.
7OProsser, supra n. 7, pp. 272-273; Gaskill v. Melelia, supra; Bricker v. Gardner, supra n. 77.
8OProsser, supra n. 7, pp. 273-274, 272; Lowndes, 16 Minn. L.R. 361; Morris, Relation of
Criminal Statutes to Civil Liberty, 46 Harv. L.R. 453.
I11t is these purposes of the statute under consideration which the decisions have stressed in
development ofIthe negligence per se doctrine; semble, Jinks v. Currie, supra n. 59; Stark v. Fuller-
ton Trucking Co., supra n. 66.
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acceptance, as it does upon the application of the doctrine. It is no answer, how-
ever, to the trial court's objection to the obliteration of the age presumption
rules and its contention that the legislature did not. intend to make riding on the
tailboard negligence per se in all cases, to say the legislative mandate of "No
person" is so comprehensive as to absorb all persons except those specifically
excepted. The point is, why apply the criminal statute and the negligence per
se rule at all in this situation.82 It is no confidence betrayed to acknowledge that
the courts decide this matter as they see fit.83 The answer to the issue as the
court frames it in the D'Ambrosio case,
" ...the question for decision is whether a jury in a civil suit may be
permitted to set aside the statute," 8'
is, that the jury may do it if the courts say so. The question remains, why should
the court say so.
By saying that an act is negligence per se the question of negligence is elim-
inated. The liability is predicated upon a failure to comply with an absolute rule of
law rather than a standard of conduct created by a jury for that particular case.
The relation of the statute to normal social standards is significant. The criminal
law which formulates an existing, but unformulated, standard and provides pun-
ishment for failure to conform does not alter the normal conduct. Such a law
formulates a standard which can be used in tort cases. On the other hand, a crim-
inal statute which prescribes a course of conduct where none has existed before,
may impose liability akin to liability without fault when it is applied to the civil
law. If it provides a much needed regulation condoned by society, the imposi-
tion of that degree of liability may be justified, as in the child labor field. Since,
in the case of the latter type law, there is no existing standard of conduct, it may
be advisable to restrict the chastisement for such conduct to the criminal penalty.
The judge and the jury have traditionally shared the function of determining the
standard of conduct in negligence cases.85 It has been suggested 'that the judge
use his position to expand the negligence per se rule by borrowing standards from
the criminal law more freely than some of the present limitations of the rule
82The cases relied upon to support the proposition that a saving from the operation of a statute
by disabilities must be expressed involved a statute' designed to quiet titles to real estate and an-
other designed to assure the finality of adjudications of the Orphans Courts after a lapse of five
years. In lall of the cases, the person under disability was attempting to assert a claim barred by
the statute in question. As the court asserted, these statutes are " founded in the highest consid-
erations of public policy." Furthermore, in thelcase of the Act of April 22, 1856 P. L. 532, the
legislature had expressly omitted a saving clause in favor of married women, minors, and persons
of unsound mind which had been a part of the previous statute on the subject in 1785. In Re El-
kins Estate, 190 A. 650, 325 Pa. 373, (The Fiduciaries Act) ; Warfield v. Fox, 53 Pa. 382 (1866) ;
Way v. Hooton, 156.Pa. 8 (1893); McCall v. Webb, 88 Pa. 150 (1878); The latter three cases
construed the Act of April 22, 1856 P. L. 532.
8SSee Lowndes, 16 Minn. L.R. 361; 364, "This may be what the court does, but it is not
what it says." Prosser, supra n. 7, p. 274, . . .it is the courts' own decision which brings about
such a result; .. .
84Supra n. 1, p. 238.
S
5
Bohlen, F. H., Studies in the Law of Torts, (1926), pp. 601-613; Prosser, pp. 279-284;
Morris, 46 Harv. L.R. 453, 453-456.
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now permit.86 Contrary to this position is that of Professor Lowndes, who argues
that since all careless conduct is not negligent, likewise all illegal conduct should
not necessarily be negligent. Only that conduct which a jury feels is so socially
undesirable that it should be penalized by a civil as well as criminal liability should
be negligent." Of course, this latter position is critical of the entire negligence
per se rule.
The judge when he decides to adopt or reject the criminal standard should
be guided by two inquiries. "Is standard a fair formulation of the community
standard .... neither too severe nor too lenient for use in a tort case? If the
answer is, yes, " . . .are there any unique aspects of the present case which make
the standard unsuitable?"88  If it is conceded that hitching rides on trucks and
riding on tailboards violates a standard of social conduct already recognized, the
answer to the second inquiry should be in the affirmative. There is ground for
the concession on the first question in the cases which declare that a person who
rides on a running board is guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law in
an action against the driver or owner of the vehicle.89 The decisions were followed
in the case of a person riding on a tailgate when there was room inside of a truck. 90
In an action against a third person, the contributory negligence of the person so
riding the vehicle is for the jury. The court ruled, ' ...it is not clear beyond
doubt that one who rides a tailboard will be run into by another vehicle." 91 The
actions against third persons involve doubt as to the forseeability of harm which
the D'Ambrosio case does not present. As in the running board cases, the riding
of a tailgate presents an obvious risk to an adult concerning which leasonable
men can have no difference of opinion. Even so, the Court in the D'Ambrosio
case concedes that, but for the statute, the question of contributory negligence of
the minor plaintiff would have been for the jury.
92
There are "unique aspects of the present case' '9 which make the use of
negligence per se rules unsuitable. The plaintiff is a member of a group whose
conduct is judged by a different standard than that of adults. Children as a class
have been given special consideration. The use of the age presumption has estab-
lished rigid standards within certain limitations noted above. But, in the age
group of which this plaintiff is a member, the presumption has operated to estab-
lish that the child does not possess the capacity of an adult and is presumed not to
possess it. His conduct, therefore, is measured by a different standard, to wit,
that of children of similar age, intelligence and experience. That involves the
86Morris, supra n. 85, especially p. 477.
87Lowndes, 16 Minn. L.R. 361, 370.
88 Morris, supra n. 80, at p. 469.
89Srednick v. Sylak, 343 Pa. 486, 23 A. 2d. 333; Valente v. Linder, 340 Pa. 508, 17 A. 2d. 371;
Schoemaker v. Hovey, 291 Pa. 30; 139 A. 45, 61 A.L.R. 1241.
90Earll v. Wichser, 346 Pa. 357, 30 A. 2d. 803 (1943).
9libid., p. 804.
92Supra, n. 1, p. 258.9 3
Morris, supra n. 88.
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formulation of a social standard of conduct. When the function of formulating
that standard involves judgment factors, which are the subjective elements of the
test of negligence, a line of accepted authority has placed it with the jury. This
procedure has avoided the rigidity which judicially created standards would possess
and has allowed each case to be decided on its particular merits. 9'
Tht use of the negligence per se rule in a statutory violation of criminal
law by an infant between the ages of seven and fourteen would measure his
conduct by a rigid and fixed standard created by the legislature. In civil law, the
infant is presumed not to have the adult's capacity to perceive danger; therefore,
his conduct is measured by a special standard of behavior. In criminal law, the
same infant is presumed incapable of committing a crime because he is presumed
not to possess criminal intent. To declare that he is negligent per se in civil law,
thereby depriving him of the usual consideration given in that sphere of the law,
because he violated a criminal statute, when the criminal law would give him a spe-
cial consideration were he accused in that sphere, seems incongruous. Such a deci-
sion can only be rationalized and supported by strong policy reasons which go be-
yond the ordinary bases and reasons justifying the use of negligence per se. If such
motives influenced the decision, they should be expressed. That the standard
by which these infants are judged are fluid and have been kept so by judicial
decision which has permitted them to be formulated by the jury is founded on a
moral judgment based upon the idea of justice and fairness which is woven through
the entire fabric of the concept of negligence.9 5
It is submitted, that the rule of negligence per se in the case under discussion
is an unwarranted extension of a fixed legislative standard into an area in which
the rigid standard of conduct is contrary to the recognized method of approach
and is unfair to the group to which it is applied. The rule is unfair not only
because it shifts the placement of the function of formulating standards, but that
it is placed with the legislature, which does not have civil liability in mind, much
less, any consideration of a sub-standard group.96
9 4
Bohlen, supra n. 85, pp. 606-613.
9
5
Hall, Criminal Law and Torts, 43 Columbia L.1R. 753, 967. "Any legal system that excepts
individuals from liability for the harms they cause does so in reliance upon certain principles of
culpability. The principles comprise a body of value judgments formulated in terms of
personal responsibility." In'criminal law such limitations are expressed by judgments as to who
ought to be punished; "it is equally true that in torts, also, the rules imposing limitations on liabili-
ty of all persons, rest on'moral judgments regarding the justice of compensation, which in the usual
expression signify who ought to bear various losses." at p. 775.
Cooley, T. M., II, Problems in Contributory Negligence, 89 U. of Pa. L.R. 335. "If the
function of the concept is . .. , simply to provide a lubricant for the frictions caused by accidents
occurring in a highly complex society, it must do so by the application of rough and ready stan-
dards. In the first place, the acceptability of the results obtained will be largely determined not by
accurate criticism based on scientific grounds, but by a necessary nebulous concept of fairness." at
p. 342.
9
6Morris, supra n. 80, maintains the difficulty with the rule is that it does not place the func-
tion with the judiciary where it rightfully belongs. Contra, Lowndes, supra n. 47, who takes
the position that the function of formulating the standard is peculiarly that of the jury and should
remain so.
